I have monitor the Thailand politics & economy since the mid 60's.
My observations is that Thailand Politics, the day to day operation is control by the Prime Minister & his cabinet. The stability of the Nations is mainly influenceby the Police & the Military General's.
The Royal Thai Kingdom for the past history have been modelling after the China Emperor Court system. Which the king is the supreme commander in the Kingdom. Although for these years of change. In the outlook the Prime Minister & it's cabinet is running the country. The King is more a less a ceremonial figure.
But because of the rich history, religion & culture. The King is still a most important or Supreme figure in the heart of the Thai people.
Between, mid 60's till now, I have witness many military coup's that took the power. & Finally when the King step in & ordered the General's to return the power to their Parliment & return the Democracy to the people.
Thasin is consider very fortunate that after the Last economy downtown , with the guranty purchase order from China. Their Economy is more healthy then anytime in the history.
Thasin may think that using the Military power to enlarge his power base. But that would also invoke the ill feeling of the Police force as well. Then the Parliment could be divied by the 3 groups of infleunce. Namely the People The Military & the Police. Then the equilibrium that built since 1992 would be broken.
With the Aging of the King, the situation may not be as simple to control then before. If the Military General's set another coup!! So the result is beyond imagine.
My opinions is Thaksin should re-think his strategies in the power play. & using the Military Power to his cabinet. Go further to strengthen the economy.. provide food & shelter to his fellow Thai's. Build Thailand as the Nirvana for their citizen. Then he shall be respected like a living Buddha.
Thaksin's power play with Thai generals
By Fabio Scarpello
Thai politics have always been characterized by a close association between the country's military and its politicians. But under the administration of business tycoon turned politician, Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, that relationship has changed. Where before the generals held the reigns of power, the prime minister is now calling the shots and has integrated the military into his power base. Analysts who were hoping for a de-politicization of the armed forces fear long-term negative consequences.
There seem to be no limits to Thaksin's power. Re-elected in February by an overwhelming majority to an unprecedented second consecutive term in office, he sits comfortably at the helm of the country with full control over the parliament and cabinet, the latter filled with members of his inner circle. But the prime minister's influence extends much further, encompassing big businesses, bureaucrats, politicians, most of the media, the police and - crucially - the armed forces.
At first glance, the link between Thaksin and the military is nothing new in Thailand, where politicians and generals have always stood shoulder to shoulder. Yet scraping the surface only slightly, it becomes apparent that the current association is made from a different mold. The difference is the shift in the balance of power, which has slipped away from the generals and now - for the first time - lies firmly with the prime minister.
To say that the army has dictated the political tempo in Thailand is an understatement. Historical records tell of 17 coups or attempted coups since 1932 and of generals occupying the prime minister's seat for all but eight years between 1938 and 1988. Furthermore, whenever not in power, the military had been the main force behind most of the civilian leaders who preceded the current prime minister.
The situation is different with Thaksin, who despite training at a military cadet school and serving as a policeman for a few years, entered politics as a civilian and has been legitimized by two democratic elections. Moreover, Thaksin's ascent has coincided with probably the weakest period of the army in modern Thai history.
The military began losing ground in the political arena in the late 1980s, but the turning point in the civilian-military relationship was the violent civilian resistance of May 1992, which brought an end to Thailand's last military regime. The resulting pro-reform movement, culminating with the drafting of the 1997 constitution, cornered the generals' political aspirations and threatened the army's status and its main financial resources. As a consequence, the military had no option but to lie low and partially de-politicize. This trend was interrupted, however, in 2001, when Thaksin was first elected premier.
In this position, Thaksin carved a new role in society for the generals and secured the army's financial resources, halting its decline. Both moves won him favor among most high-ranking officers. The prime minister also set out to transform the country's three armed forces - the Royal Thai Army, the navy and the air force - into another branch of his power base. The approach he used to achieve such a goal involved meddling with the military's internal promotions.
Making over the military
When Thaksin became prime minister, the military lacked a clear role. With the communist threat long gone and without any immediate foreign threat, the military had difficulties in claiming a special role in society and was somehow squeezed out of the limelight by the democratization movement that pressed for its de-politicization. The new situation was in stark contrast to the previous 50 years, during which the military was wrapped up in an aura of reverence and generals were offered senior positions in government agencies.
Thaksin filled the vacuum by using the army to flank the police in dealing with civil issues. Under the current administration, the army has been called upon to deal with protests in rural areas and to play a pivotal role in the "war on drugs" and the "war on dark influences" begun in 2003. The army is currently involved in the predominantly Muslim provinces of Yala, Pattani and Narathiwat, where civilian unrest has flared since January 2004.
In addition, Thaksin stepped in to ease the chronic surplus of generals in the Thai army by offering "high influential advisory governmental positions" to more then 50 of them. The prime minister has also restored the army's influence over the country's foreign policy - another area in which it had previously been losing ground.
Likewise, Thaksin's rise to power found the armed forces struggling to hold on to their main sources of finance. The share of the national budget allocated to the military had shrunk gradually from 18%, allocated in the 1980s, to about 11-12% in the mid-1990s and 9% in 1999-2000. Even more dangerous for the army was the instruction laid down by the 1997 constitution that called for Thailand's radio and television frequencies to be placed under public management. Such a change meant that the army was in line to lose its main source of income, namely its control over roughly 200 radio frequencies and television Channel 5.
Since 2001, Thaksin has increased the military budget, lifted the embargo on military procurements that had been in place since the 1997 Asian financial crisis, and approved the entire army's spending list for the 2005-13 period. With Thaksin in power, the army has also managed to hold on to its radio frequencies.
Hidden dangers in controlling the military
Regenerating the armed forces' status and securing its financial resources were important means for Thaksin to secure the generals' gratitude, but what turned the military into another part of Thaksin's power base was the relentless meddling with its internal promotions.
In the past four years, Thaksin has pushed some members of his own family and no fewer then 35 of his former cadet-school classmates, collectively know as "Class 10", up the seniority ladder in the army and, to a lesser extent, in the navy and the air force. In doing so, he has shaped a powerful new clique that owes a lot to him and little to ability and seniority. The generals' gratitude translates into open support for Thaksin.
Among the beneficiaries of Thaksin's patronage, Chaisit Shinawatra, one of Thaksin's cousins, deserves special mention.
From August 2001 (the first military reshuffle under Thaksin) to August 2003, Chaisit shot to the very top of the army's hierarchy. In rapid succession he was promoted to lieutenant-general (2001), full general (2002) and then army commander (2003). His meteoric rise - as noted at the time by several military experts - would have been impossible without political connections. Last August, Chaisit was pushed into the highly ceremonial role of armed forces supreme commander, after his failure to ease separatist tensions in the troubled south and his involvement in Channel 5's controversial plan to be listed on the Thai stock exchange.
Some analysts have argued that Thaksin is playing with fire with his military meddling and say he not only risks burning his fingers but might set the whole house ablaze.
"The re-politicization of the military is very dangerous for Thailand and for Thaksin himself; he cannot handle it," said Professor Ukrist Pathmanand, assistant director of the Institute of Asian Studies at Bangkok's Chulalongkorn University and co-author of the book The Thaksinization of Thailand.
Part of what worries Professor Pathmanand - and a few others - is that by allowing Class 10 to dominate the armed forces, Thaksin has opened the door to the risk of another military coup. In his book, Pathmanand noted that some of Thailand's past military coups - Class 7 or "The Young Turks" in 1977, attempts in 1981 and 1985 and Class 5 in 1991- were the direct consequence of a specific military-class supremacy.
"It has happened before and it could happen again," Pathmanand said.
Other critics, including Suriyasai Katasila, secretary general of the Campaign for Popular Democracy, fear that by allowing his friends to leapfrog the seniority ladder, Thaksin has created a larger and more unhappy layer of generals. Such a situation, they argue, could lead to a takeover, especially if the socio-political situation in the country were to change.
"Thaksin has interfered too much with the promotion of his peers in the military," Suriyasai said.
Although the logic behind both analyses stands, it must be noticed that Thaksin's current grip on power and the lessons of history have made the eventuality of another "successful" military coup in Thailand a slim possibility - as noted by Abhisit Vejjajiva, deputy leader of the Democrat Party, in an interview in late December.
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